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CRIMINAL LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE OBLIGATION OF ADVOCACY IN REVIEW OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
LARRY I. PALMER*

It is generally assumed that there is some relationship between the United States Supreme
Court's "right to counsel" cases and the expanded
role of appellate courts in criminal law decisionmaking.1 For instance, the Court's decision requiring appointed counsel on appeal to file a brief before
he seeks withdrawal on the grounds that the appeal
is "without merit", A11ders v. California;2 has led
to two kinds of inquiry because of this assumption.
Does Anders define, albeit inadequately, courtappointed appellate counsel's obligation to his
indigent client?3 Or is A11ders an expression of the
Court's previous decisions requiring appointed
counsel at trial4 and on the :first appeal as of right? 5
As to an emerging issue such as when an individual
is entitled to appointed counsel on a discretionary
appeal, 6 the lines of inquiry generated by the assumption lead to more difficult questions about
the functional relationship of appellate courts and
the wide-spread presence of counsel in the criminal
process.7
Despite this widely held assumption, few academic resources have been expended on systematic
analyses of the constitutional doctrines dealing with
counsel and the role of reviewS in the criminal
*Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers-Camden,
A.B. Harvard, 1966; LL.B. Yale, 1969.
I would like to express my appreciation to Mary
Sibley, a third year student at the Rutgers-Camden
Law School, for her research assistance in the preparation of this article.
I would also like to acknowledge the aid of my colleague Professor Tom J. Farer, who was kind enough to
read a draft of this paper.
1H. PACKER, LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 237
(1968) (hereinafter cited as PACKER, Lmrrs].
2 386 u.s. 738 (1967).
3 Herman, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 701 (1973).
~Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
6 Ross v. Moffitt, 483 F. 2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
granted, 415 U.S. 909, (1974).
7 See Ross v. Moffitt, 42 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. April
30, 1974) (oral argument).
8 For a pre-Gideon analysis of the counsel problem see
Kamisar, Tile Riglzt to Counsel and tile Fourteenth
Amemlmetzt: A Dialogue on tlze Most Pervasive Riglzt of
tlze Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1962).

process. When did the Court begin exploring the
possible roles that appointed counsel might play in
the appeals process? Anders is, as will be demonstrated, one such instance where the Justices were
struggling explicitly with the implementations of
its growing body of constitutional doctrines of
counsel and review. There have been few discussions of whether in fact, from the viewpoints of
various Justices, the problem of the right to appointed counsel on a discretionary appeal, ought
to be viewed as an extension of the doctrines dealing with access to review, the doctrines of counsel
at trial, or a combination of the doctrines. The lack
of such systematic analyses of these cases with a
variety of doctrinal bases is unfortunate at a time
of general debate over judicial administration. Such
debate has led to judicial criticism of the performance of counsel in the criminal process and
suggestions for reform. 9
The impetus for the systematic analysis presented in this article is the recurrence of constitutional issues surrounding counsel in the criminal
process10 and the current widespread debate over
judical administration. Part I proposes an integrated theory of the constitutional decisions dealing
with the right to counsel and the review of criminal
convictions. Such an integration assumes that various decision-makers in criminal law perform different functions. The corollary of this assumption is
that the difference in function should lead to different constitutional analyses by appellate courts. To
develop an integrated theory, it will be argued that
those cases dealing directly with the function of
counsel and appellate courts in criminal law must
be analyzed in terms of constitutional principles.
The purpose of such an integrated theory is to
'o See, e.g., Burger, Tlze Special SkiUs of Advocacy:
Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates
Essential to Our System of Jtestice'l 42 FORDHAM L. REv.
227 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Burger, Special Skills];
Bazelon, Tlze Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U.

em. L. REv. 1 (1973).

1° See, e g., Fuller v. Oregon, 96 Ore. 457, 504 P.2d
1393, cert. gra1Jted, 414 U.S. 1111, afi'd, _U.S._, 94
S. Ct. 2116 (1974).
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delineate some of those unique features of modern
criminal adjudication that are viewed as "fundamental". Such a demarcation will make more visible the part criminal adjudication plays in the
"crisis of the courts".
Part II uses the integrated constitutional theory
as a tool for evaluating or assessing the many proposals for reforming courts. To illustrate the utility
of the analysis, two current problems will be discussed in terms of the integrated analysis developed
in Part I. First, proposals to limit the availability
of one kind of review of a criminal conviction-federal habeas corpus-will be discussed. In most discussions these proposals have been viewed as the
problem of determining when criminal litigation
has become final. Second, a variety of proposals to
expedite appellate criminal appeals will be discussed. These proposals have been viewed as
addressing the problem of "speedy disposition" of
criminal appeals. With an integrated constitutional
theory, however, both problems can be analyzed
and resolved in terms of allocating the resources of
appellate courts and counsel in criminal law decision-making.
Whether the proposed integrated constitutional
theory or some other is adopted, several new perspectives are generated by an integrated approach.
While some avenues of reform are foreclosed because of the constitutional nature of the principle
jeopardized by reform, many other avenues are
still open. Despite the constitutional overlay on
criminal law decision-making in recent years, state
bodies have more latitude to modify the administration of their criminal law than has been generally assumed. Finally, legal scholars must start
to examine a new legal institution created by constitutional adjudication-counsel for the accused
and the convicted in the criminal process. Under
an integrated approach, the cases dealing with
counsel and review in criminal law should no longer
be seen solely as constitutional opportunities to
protect the "indigent".

I. ThE

VARIETIES OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND
ACCESS TO REVIEW

The proposed integrated theory proceeds from
the premise that judges, even in their constitutional
decision-making, decide cases in terms of certain
principles and rules.11 The proposition is congruent
with the recent analysis suggesting that there are
11 See generaUy Dworkin, A Model of Rules, 35 U.
Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967).
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similarities between judicial reasoning in common
law and constitutional casesP For instance,
judges do not generally develop basic "policies"
of law in deciding common law and constitutional
disputesP On the other hand, when the rule of law
employed to decide a common law or constitutional
case is justified by a "principle" of law, the scope
of review is more searching than when the rule is
justified by a policy of law.14 While drawing the
distinction between "principles," "rules," and
"policies" is considerably more difficult in constitutional law than in common law doctrines,15 the
method of analysis based on this distinction helps
to illuminate the function of review in the criminal
process.
Since judges often differ when any "fundamental" issue of law is decided, it is hardly surprising that the Justices have had many differences
in recent constitutional cases dealing with the state
criminal process. Under the proposed theory it is
possible to characterize the nature of these differences in terms of divergent views as to what principles or rules should govern the case before the
Court. Given the rapidity of the constitutionalization of the criminal process, Justices often agree
with the result or the new rule developed in the
case but feel compelled to write concurring opinions.16 Once the differences among the Justices have
been identified, the proposed theory provides a
method of resolving these conflicts of principles and
rules, at least in the area of the right to counsel and
review of criminal convictions. Essentially the
method of analysis requires that cases that are
identified as containing clear conflicts of principles
should be analyzed as attempts to create new principles. If the major import of the case is to illuminate a conflict of principles among the Justices,
these decisions should not be analyzed as containing particular constitutional rules that must be
followed in solving the problems of judicial administration. Rather these decisions are more usefully viewed as stating constitutional policies of
fair adjudication that are developed by a particular
kind of appellate court, the Supreme Court of the
United States. The cases dealing with review of
12 See generally Wellington, Comm011 Law Rules a1111
Constitutional Double Sta1111ards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
u I d. at 267.
U[d. at 269.
15 I d.
16 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25

(1972).
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criminal convictions17 and the role of appointed
counsel on appeal18 are examples of basic policy decisions by the Court without a clear articulation of
of underlying constitutional principle.
The theory will help to explain why the overall
impact of the cases dealing with the right to counsel
and review of criminal convictions is an expanded
role for appellate courts in criminal law decisionmaking. With such an explanation it becomes apparent that criminal law decision-making may be
an exception to the general rule that appellate
courts do not develop basic legal policies.l 9 By
creating more issues for judicial resolution, the
Supreme Court has not usurped the legislative role,
rather the Court's decisions have realigned the institutional competences of the courts, the legislature, and other decision-makers. As an explanation
or rationalization of the new role for appellate
courts, the integrated theory becomes useful to
those resolving the problems of judicial administration.
The integrated approach differs significantly
from recent discussions of the right to counsel in
the criminal process.20 There has been a tendency
to treat the right to counsel cases as one legal doctrine to be expanded or constricted in subsequent
decisions. A given decision on the right to counsel
is thus viewed as indicative of a broad trend in
constitutional decision-making. Following this line
of analysis, one expects a decision holding that an
individual is entitled to counsel at a deferred sentencing proceeding21 to signal the the development
of a constitutional theory of the correctional process by the Court.22
A second type of commentary on right to counsel
cases assumes that the instrumental view of law is
the standard of evaluating the Court's decisions.23
17Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 u.s. 12 (1956).
18 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

u Cf. Wellington, Comnum Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication,
83 YALE L.J. 221 267 (1973).
20 See, e.g., Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the
Relzabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rltay, 47
TEx. L. REv. 1 (1968); Van Dyke, Parole Revocation
Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CAI..IF.
L. REv. 1215 (1971).
21 Mempa. v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967).
22 See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabilitative Ideal: Tire View from Mempa v. Rltay, 47 TEx. L.
REv. 1, 10 n.44 (1968).
23 Van Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings in California: Tlze Right to Counsel, 59 CAI..IF. L. REv. 1215
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The important point of analysis in this type of
commentary is to determine how individuals will
respond to a particular decision to grant or withhold counsel. Thus, in discussing whether counsel
is required at parole revocation hearings, one commentator suggests that the courts' subsequent refusal to hold that a parolee is per se entitled to
counsel at a revocation hearing signals the end of
due process.2-l
The integrated theory proposes a method of
criticism that follows a different line of inquiry. As
to either decision involving the right to counsel,
the integrated analysis seeks first to ascertain if
there is a particular principle dealing with counsel
in the decisions. After determining what the principle is, the next line of inquiry is whether the articulated principle is consistent with the principle
previously articulated in the case law. At a third
level of inquiry, one _x;night ask if the particular
rule established in the case is in conflict with any
principle articulated in the cases. For example,
both the decision requiring counsel in all deferred
probation revocation proceedings and the decision requiring counsel to be provided in probation proceedings on a case by case analysis are
consistent with the previously articulated principles requiring counsel in the criminal process.
While the integrated theory is a legal theory of
due process in criminal law decision-making, the
theory should not be confused with Professor
Packer's Due Process Model. 25 In explaining the
impact of Gidetm v. W ainwrighl,28 which requires
the states to provide counsel for those accused of a
felony, Packer asserts that the opinion "will remain
for a long time the watershed decision in the evolution of the criminal process." 27 Such a statement
creates the impression that Gidem remains the
analytical starting point for discussions of lawyers
in the criminal process. The proposed theory accepts Professor Packer's notions that the widespread presence of lawyers has significantly modified the criminal process. However,, the proposed
analysis will start with the principle of constitutional law involved in the Gidetm decision. Along
(1971). But see Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972).
u Van Dyke, supra at 1217. This same co=entator
suggested that Eldridge Cleaver was forced to remain
in "exile" by the failure of the Court to require procedural safeguards, including the right to counsel, at
parole revocation hearings.
25 PACKER,

LIMITS.
372 u.s. 335 (1963).
27 PACKER, LIMITS at 237.
26
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with Professor Packer's analysis, the integrated
theory recognizes that a constitutional requirement
of counsel in state criminal processes creates a host
of new legal issues.28 The integrated legal theory is
in direct conflict with the notion that to use either
Due Process or Crime Control Models is the
method of resolving these new issues.
Reduced to its essentials, the integrated theory
of counsel and review cases focuses on three principles. The Court has explicitly recognized that an
individual accused of a crime is required to have a
lawyer at trial in order to increase the accused's
opportunity to defend against a criminal charge.
This first principle will be referred to as the principle of an opportunity to defend against the deprivation of liberty. Second, the Court has implicitly
developed a principle that requires that convicted
persons have an opportunity to have another body
determine if the status of "convicted person" is
legitimate. This principle, referred to as the opportunity to litigate the legitimacy of state control,
is implicit only because the issue of whether review
of a criminal conviction is required has not been
raised in recent times.29 To relate the :first two
Packer raises questions about GideotJ, some of which
have been subsequently answered by the Court:
In what kinds of criminal prosecutions does the
right to assigned counsel apply-in "serious"
offenses only? If so, what are the criteria of "seriousness"? When does the right to counsel begin
and end? Are the limits the same for assigned
counsel as for privately retained counsel? Looming up behind these questions are even more portentous ones. Does the effective assistance of
counsel require that the state must provide financial compensation for the lawyers who serve?
Must provision be made for other expenses of an
effective defense? ld.
29 Despite the relatively recent introduction of appellate review in the United States, a modem constitutional theory without a concept of review of a criminal
conviction is now unthinkable on several counts. Pragmatically speaking, the Court's own opinions have
created more appellate issues for the lawyers now
constitutionally required to be in the criminal process.
Were there no state criminal appeals, there would be
greater incentives for these lawyers to cast all appellate
issues in terms of constitutional law in order to gain
federal review. Out of self-interest or a concern for
minimizing federal interference with the state criminal
processes, the Court is uulikely to allow states the
option of eliminating all state review of criminal conVICtions. See generally L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS
(1939); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
28

Haheas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HA'Rv. L. REv.
441 (f963); Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Clzanging Court: A Model for a New Equal
Protectiot~, 86 HA'Rv. L. REv. 1 (1972). While it ap-

pears unlikely at present that any state legislature
would seriously contemplate a policy of no criminal
appeals, it is a theoretical possibility under conventional
analyses in the states' attempt to "ration justice". Cf.
Hazard, Rationing Justice, 8 J. LAW & EcoNOMICS
(1965).
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principles in an integrated approach, a third principle should be recognized. That p_rinciple is the
obligation of appellate counsel to use the review
procedures available to argue that the conviction is
illegal. ThiS principle will be called the obligation
of advocacy. In furtherance of the principle, the
theory of illegality argued to the appellate court
should be based on the theory of defense employed
by counsel to defend the accused at trial. None of
these three principles necessarily explains all of the
cases on review and counsel since many of these
cases contain rules rather than principles. R,ather,
these principles will be used to demonstrate that
these cases can be understood as part of an integrated modem theory of criminal Iaw decisionmaking. Finally, it is not contended that particular
Justices have used this particular integrated theory
in their decisions. It is only contended that they
could in future decisions or that others-state
appellate courts, court administrators, and the
providers of counsel-could use the analysis to resolve certain problems of judicial administration.
A. The Opportunity to Defend Against
the Deprivation of Liberty
A decade after Gideon, it is still important to emphasize that its doctrinal foundation is found in a
variety of theories of due process. The primary
issue resolved in Gideon is whether the state is
obligated to provide trial counsel for an individual
accused of a "serious crime". Or put another way,
the question is whether some fundamental notion
of "fairness" requires that those accused of a crime
be assisted by counsel. While a unanimous Court
answered the question by placing the obligation of
providing counsel on the states, the variety of theories of due process available to arrive at the result
is amply demonstrated by the three concurring
opinions.80 All of the divergent methods of reasoning to the same result are functions of the particular Justice's theory of due process. Thus, each
opinion contains an explicit theory of the Supreme
Court's review function in criminal law.
A tendency of some courts and commentators to
merge discussions of Gide01t with cases dealing explicitly with equal protection notions:n shifts the
ao 372 U.S. at 345 (Dou~las, J., concurring); id. at
347 (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 349 (Harlan, J.,

concurring).
31 Justice Clark does this explicitly in Anders when he
cites Gideon as one of the principles to which he adheres. 386 U.S. 738, 742 (1967). Apparently the more
accepted "equal protection" analysis used in Anders'
companion, Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967),
allows the dissenters in Anders to concur in Entsminger.
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goal of Gideon to equalizing the plights of the "indigent" and "non-indigent" defendant. But such
interpretations ignore the scrupulous avoidance of
any mention of equal protection in the Court's
opinion.32 In addition, such discussions have confused the due process issue in Gide01t with a related
secondary issue involving counsel. Admittedly,
when the authoritative state decision-making body
has decided that retained counsel is allowed, the
state may be required to. furnish counsel to the
"indigent". And such a question does raise an issue
of "equal protection" under some analyses. 33 Some
commentators suggest thatfor "pragmatic reasons"
the due process and. equal protection grounds of
decisions may become unimportant in constitutional decision-making.34 However, in determining
which matters are fundamental principles of modem criminal law decision-making, the due processequal protection dichotomy is important to understanding the divergence and convergence of the
variety of theories utilized in deciding cases.
The recent extension of Gide01t to less serious
crimes in Argersinger v. Hamlin35 is illustrative of
both the convergence as to result but divergence as
to the underlying theory of due process. Once again
a unanimous Court, but with three concurring
opinions, held that a state must provide counsel
whenever its processes of adjudication result in an
actual deprivation of liberty.36 The "rule" of Argersinger is workable from a reviewing court's perspective since an allegation of lack of counsel at
trial requires few judicial resources for its resolu386 U.S. at 752 (Stewart, Black, and Harlan, concurring). See discussion in text pp. 25-27. See also
Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971),
ajf'd on other groumJs, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). Cj. Birzon,
Kasanof, Forma, The Right to Counsel and Indigent
Accused in Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction in New York

State,14 BUFFALO L. REv. 428, 432 {1965); Kamisar,
Equal Justice in the Gatelwuses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure in CluMINAL JusTICE IN OUR

TIME 1, 64-81 (1965).
32 Israel, Gideon v. W aitlwright: Tile "Art" of Overrulit~g, 1963 SUP. CT. REv. 211, 245-48.
33 Cf. Wainwright v. Cottle, 477 F. 2d 269 (5th Cir.),
judgment vacated, 414 U.S. 895 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
uSee, e.g., Gunther, Forward: In Searclz of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal
Protection, 86 HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 41-43 (1972).

35407

u.s. 25 (1972).

as One justification for the Court's peculiar rule is

that it defines the limits of the si.'!:th amendment's
requirement of counsel in "criminal prosecutions".
Such a definitional approach explains, for instance, why
the sixth amendment-fourteenth amendment jury
trial requirement is made operative by the possibility
of sb: months incarceration, Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66 (1970), but the counsel requirement depends on
the actual result of trial and sentence.
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tion. However, from a trial court's perspective, the
actual rule articulated will lead to several obvious
problems in administration since .it requires a trial
judge to make a prosp~tive judgment as to what
the sentence will be in a relatively minor crime.37
But focusing on the problems of implementing the
Argersi1tger rule ignores its more significant impact
on unresolved problems of constitutionally requiring appointed lawyers as part of criminal law decision-making. Besides .reaffirming the principle of
Gideon as the opportunit;y. to defend against a
criminal charge, each opinion addresses the problem of effectuating the new counsel rules. The
tentative guidelines for resolving the problems appear dependent upon the particular legal theory
employed by each ] ustice.
All the opinions discuss the variety of ways in
which the legal services required by the Court's
expansion of Gide01t can be met. ] ustice Douglas, in
the lead opinion, suggests that legislative reform
may meet the new demand for lawyers. His suggestion is that "decriminalizing" some petty of:fenses would decrease the need for lawyers.33 To
suggest that "decriminalizing" public drunkenness
or narcotic addiction will decrease the need for
lawyers is somewhat curious. If by decriminalization Justice Douglas means that another form of
state process such as an administrative agency:
should be used, the need for lawyers has not necessarily been diminished. As a matter of constitutional due process principles, the "civil" processes
of state control that involve the deprivation of
liberty require lawyers in the adjudicative part of
the decision-making.39 Most legislative schemes
involving "civil" commitment already require. that
counsel be appointed.40 It is unlikely that the Court
will allow legislatures to take away counsel or ban
counsel unless the principle of counsel~s necessity
when the state deprives the individual of liberty
is to be reexamined. Under existing constitutional
analyses, "decriminalization" should lead to transfer of perhaps non-existing lawyers from the minor
criminal courts to the civil commitment adjudication. Perhaps Justice Douglas thinks that this civil
adjudication will require less time than minor
:rr 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
33 1d. at 38-39 n.9.
39
Cf. In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
40 See, e.g., 42 U.S. C. § 3413 (Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act); CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS
CODE § 5252.1 (West 1954) (alcoholism and mental
illness); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.46 (mental illness)
§§ 392.25, 392.26, 392.32 {tuberculosis), § 396.102(a)
(alcoholism); and N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:9-12.21 (1964)
(alcoholism).
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criminal offenses. If so, then some more lawyers are
available.
Another possible legal reform of a judicial nature
to meet the demand for lawyers is to enlarge the
pool of available persons by modification of the
constitutional definition of counsel. In Argersinger
at least three Justices indicated their willingness to
experiment with a constitutional definition of counsel broader than one restricted to members of the
organized bar.41 If law students under adequate
faculty and professional supervision can meet the
constitutional standard for counsel in lower courts,
the number of "lawyers" available has been increased.
Rather than expand or experiment with various
constitutional notions of counsel, Chief Justice
Burger expressed faith in the ability of the traditionally organized bar to meet the needs. 42 Without
further guidance from the Court, the Chief Justice
expressed faith that the organized bar could and
would meet the needs generated by an evolving
constitutional standard of counsel.43
·
Justice Powell's approach looks directly at
changing the Court's own constitutional analysis
as a possible solution. He attempts to formulate a
rule under an explicitly :flexible theory of due
process.44 Such an analysis allows him to express
doubts, in view of the differing ability of the states
to furnish counsel, about the wisdom of new prophylactic constitutional rules requiring counsel.
For instance, a less rigid analysis might allow the
requirement of counsel for the accused to depend
upon whether the state uses counsel in the particular proceeding.45 Since the efficacy of any new
constitutional rule in terms of maintaining the
purpose of the principle is in doubt, Powell's analysis requires the scrutinizing of each factual situation to determine if counsel's presence furthers or
hinders the opportunity of individuals to defend
against a deprivation of liberty.46 But since the

state court bad tried to formulate the more rigid
constitutional rule that counsel is required if there
was a possibility of six months imprisonment, he
voted to reverse and remand.
Once it is clear that the obligation to provide
counsel is derived from a variety of theories of due
process, the use of different types of analysis for
requiring or withholding counsel at certain nontrial stages is explicable.
The incompatible positions of some of the Justices in cases holding that counsel is required at
"a critical stage" of the pre-trial process are examples of a conflict over what is the appropriate
constitutional rule for counsel as opposed to the
appropriate constitutional principle. For example,
a recent case held that counsel was not required
at a photo identification before trial. The majority's analysis started with the assumption that
counsel is required for the accused at certain pretrial stages in order to increase his opportunity to
defend against the charge.47 The concurring and
dissenting opinions should be read as different
views as to whether a certain constitutional rule
requiring counsel at a pre-trial stage is necessary
to implement the basic principle of an opportunity
to defend.48 Not surprisingly, a given Justice may
find himself writing for the majority and sometimes dissenting when the Court is deciding
whether the stage of the investigative process is
a "critical stage" for the purposes of requiring
counsel. A Justice may go so far as to suggest that
his analysis of when counsel is or is not required
keeps a semblance of principled constitutional
adjudication.49
A more generalized view of some of the right to
counsel cases as constitutional rules rather than
principles has several important consequences for

41407 U.S. at 40 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by
Stewart and Douglas, J. J.).
42 !d. at 43-44 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
43 !d. at 44. See also, Burger, Special Skills.
44 I d. at 44 (Powell, J., concurring).
45 Cj. Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a
Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 1001, 1028 (1972).
A flexible due process analysis of whether counsel is
required in summary court martial proceedings was
used by the Nmth Circuit recently. Daigle v. Warner
490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1974) See also Mills v. Municip;J
Ct, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329
{1973).
46 I would adhere to the principle of due process
that requires fundamental fairness in criminal

Therefore Justice Powell concludes,
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial
discretion on a case by case basis.
If the trial court should conclude that the assistance of counsel is not required in any case, it should
state its reasons so that the issue could be preserved for review. ld. at 63.
47 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
' 8 !d. at 321 Gustice Stewart concurring); id. at 326
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Cj. State v. Jones- La.-,
284 So. 2d 570 (1973).
49 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (Stewart, J.,
writing for the plurality); cj. Wellington, supra note 12.

trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the
right to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of counsel is necessary to assure a fair
trial. 407 u.s. 47.
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criminal law decision-making. In terms of theories
of decision-making, many of the pre-trial counsel
"rules" are joint legislative-judicial decisions to
control investigative agents. That is, the Court
has explicitly recognized that some of its counsel
rules can be "overruled" or "replaced" by legislative rules which are as fully effective as the Court's
constitutional rules. 6°For example, if a given state
legislature were to provide regulations and the
resources for video tapes of line-ups, then in that
state lineups are not necessarily "critical." 51
Therefore, the line-up might proceed without
counsel in that state.
Another way of demonstrating the consequences
of analyzing the right to counsel cases in terms of
whether they contain principles or rules is to reconcile the Court's treatment of these cases under its
constitutional retroactivity doctrine.~ The probSee Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
n United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
BuJ see the note of Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring in
part, dissenting in part in Wade. Id. at 262 n.*.
62 The discussion that follows is different from Professor Wellington's related analysis of the retroactivity
problem of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule.
Professor Wellington analyzes the general problem of
retroactivity in terms of ''principles" and "policies"
rather than in terms of principles and rules. Professor
Wellington begins this portion of his discussion by
stating:
I should like to examine some of these cases, as if
they were (to the extent that it is possible) common
law decisions. This enables me to put asiile questions
of federalism and habeas corpus and to test the assertions of the last several pages concerning the
legitinlacy of prospective and retroactive overruling of prior decisions and the relationship thereto
of principles and po)icies. Id. at 258 (emphasis
added).
The divergence of Wellington's analysis from the one
presented here, however, is more apparent than real.
By his exclusion of habeas corpus and federalism, for
purposes of analytical argument, Wellington has removed that which is most crucial to the constitutional
theory of due process proposed in this article.
I suspect that once we feed back in the problems of
federalism and habeas corpus, the individual Justice's
theory of constitutional principles and rules will become
operative as an explanation of their bel!avior on the
retroactivity problem in the fourth amendment area.
For instance, how an individual justice voted on the
retroactivity of United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), may be a function of whether the Justice
thought that Katz set forth a new principle of fourth
amendment analysis or was merely a new rule derived
from previously accepted principles of the constitutional analysis of the fourth amendment. The acceptance of the principles might have to be tested on a
Justice by Justice basis since the problem of the fourth
amendment's exclusionary rule is a subject of the
Justice's concept of the proper role of the Supreme Court
in state criminal process-the problems of federalism
and habeas corpus. I would venture that a careful
analysis of the late Justice Harlan's approach to the
60
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lem for an integrated theory of the counsel cases
is: why are some counsel cases held retroactive
and others not under the Court's analysis? If we
view the primary constitutional principle of the
counsel cases to be that of the opportunity to
defend against the deprivation of liberty, it is easy
to see that Gideon :fits the purpose of protecting
the integrity of the fact-finding process. 63 Similarly,
the application of a right to counsel to juvenile
adjudication will be viewed as "fundamental" so.
as to require retroactive application.u However,
the rule requiring counsel at a pre-trial line up
or a pre-trial police interrogation is not applied
retroactively although both rules were in furtherance of the primary principle.65 The explanation of
this problem of law and time is that the constitutional rules are not so fundamental that other
decision-makers cannot change the actual effect.
In the Court's own language, the presence of
counsel at trial is "essential to a fair trial." 6 6
As mentioned before, other decision-makers trying
to meet the burdens of the Court's "critical stages"
guideline might seek alternative legal remedies for
providing counsel.
A further refinement of this analysis is possible
because some of the pre-trial counsel cases are
held retroactive. 67 All of these cases are ''postfourth amendment over time might bare some rela~
tionship to his developing theory of due IJrocess. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) with United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573
586 Harlan, J., dissenting). Whether principles and rules
rather than policies and principles actually explain the
differences between the Justices in the fourth amedment
area might be demonstrated by an analysis of the work
of Justices Stewart and White. I will venture a hypothesis that the two Justices take two different principled
approaclles to the fourth amendment, even where they
agree on the result. Compare Almeida-Sanchez v. United,
States 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Stewart, J., for the majority) and United States v. Edwards, _ U.S._, 42
U.SL.W. 4463 {March 26, 1974) (White, J., for the
Majority) witlt Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 285 (White, J., dissenting) and United
States v. Edwards,- U.S._, 42 U.SL.W. 4463, 4466
{March 26, 1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Cj. Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (Stewart, J., for the
majority) and 412 U.S. 291, 297 {White, J., concurring).
153 See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
249-50 and n.14-15 (1969).
M Cj. Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972)
(holding In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) retroactive).
65 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
56 See note 53 supra.
57 McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (holding
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) retroactive); Arsenault v. Massacllusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968)
(holding White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) retroactive).
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indictment" as opposed to "pre-indictment." The
explanation of this further rule of retroactivity is
that once the indictment has come about, the
Court thinks the principle of a fair adjudication
must be protected. To the Court, the state process
has shifted from investigation to adjudication.
Thus, if one has pled guilty-the functional equivalent to an adjudication at trial-without the aid
of counsel, the Court will require retroactive
application of the new rule. 68 It is important to
realize that the retroactivity thus turns on whether
the post-indictment proceeding was enough like
the actual adjudication of guilt rather than whether
the state called the stage an "arraignment" or
"preliminary hearing."
Essential in this analysis is a determination. that
the particular stage is enough like adjudication to
be protected by those principles. The holding
that the accused is to be offered counsel at a
revocation hearing under a deferred sentencing
scheme is applied, retroactively. 59 In this manner
the Court is defining when the "criminal prosecution"-the process aimed at depriving the individual of his liberty-has ended. 60 Thus, the Court
is defining the end of the adjudicatozy phase of
the criminal process rather than starting the beginning of a new constitutional approach to sentencing. The decision on retroactivity now has the
significance of allowing the Court to shift its analysis of the constitutional necessity of counsel.
Once the defendant has been adjudicated guilty
and is under state control, the Court's analysis of
the need for counsel shifts from the per se rules
to an explicit case by case approach. In contrast
to protecting the individual from a deprivation of
liberty, the Court's most recent due process analysis of parole and probation recognizes that the
interest to be protected is only that of "conditional
liberty." 61 With only one dissent, the Court held
that an individual is not per se entitled to counsel
at a probation or parole revocation hearing. 62
Under such an analysis, the decision to have counsel at a parole or probation revocation hearing is
to be decided on a case by case basis. A due process
analysis is required because from the perspective
of a person on parole or probation-at conditional
liberty-some form of official decision-making
68

ld. But see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (holding
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) retroactive).
60 Cj. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
61 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, (1973). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
62 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US. 778 (1973).
69
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takes place when parole or probation is revoked.
Thus, the Court sees that counsel may sometimes
be required to insure the integrity of that legal
decision. 63 The Court explicitly did not consider
the situation where an individual, claiming a lack
of funds, was denied counsel when the state allowed
everyone else with the available resources to have
counsel. M The significance of this type of analysis
is that the states actually have more latitude in
structuring sentencing or dispositional decisionmaking processes than trial processes. It may be,
for instance, constitutional to deny everyone,
"rich" and "poor," counsel before, the parole
board when it revokes parole if the other resources
of decision-making are deemed adequate. These
other resources are essentially a parole board with
an adequate number of members, an investigative
staff, and a mechanism of reviewing the board's
decisions. 65 It is also possible to conceive of a system of sentencing done by a panel of experts
without laWYers as an initial matter, if a legislature thought it appropriate and devoted adequate
resources to make the system reasonably functional to its purposes.
But from the Supreme Court's institutional position of protecting the essentials of the fair trial or
fair adjudication, the presence or absence of a
laWYer is not the definitive label in constitutional
analysis. Having developed over the years an
analysis using counsel as an operative principle,
an integrated theory of due process allows the
Court to see the limits of its own principles. A
rule of evidence 66 or a rule on the order of presenting witnesses 67 may violate the policies of fair
trial because the Court sees the particular state
rules as interferring with the laWYer's ability to
defend the accused. It is also possible that the
Court's notions of fairness in terms of the adversary
system's method of trial adjudication will lead to
the result that a state's requirement that the
63Jd.

64 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 783 n.6.
Such a separation of the two issues of due process and
equal protection e;-.-plains, for instance, Justice Brennan's concurrence in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, and
his joining of the majority in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra.
In Morrissey he states the issue remains open as to
whether counsel must be furnished to the indigent parolee if the non indigent parolee is allowed counsel. 408
U.S. at 491. See Dobbs v. Wallace, 201 S.E.2d 914
(W. Va. 1974) (failure to appoint counsel to represent
indigent parolees held denial of equal protection where
the state permits parolees to be represented by retained
counsel).
66 408 U.S. at 484-90.
66 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
67
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
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defendant give notice of alibi68 will not violate due B. Access to Review of a Conviction-Litigati1:g
process unless the defendant's lawyer is precluded
the Legitimacy of State Control
from a reciprocal right to discover prosecution
The Court's own opinions dealing with criminal
evidence in order to defend. 69
appeals
suggest that at least one criminal appeal
Viewing the Court's right to counsel cases primarily in terms of principles and rules that are is constitutionally required. Griffin v. Illinois,u the
related to other policies of fair adjudication may origin of the modem theory of access to review,
help to explain why more definitive statements on contains the analytical conflict that has prevented
what is effective assistance of counsel have not a clear recognition of the principle of an oppordeveloped. First, the Court appears committed to tunity to litigate the legitimacy of state control.
counsel as essential to the opportunity to defend.7o Justice Black's opinion insists upon equal access
Second, without a functional definition of counsel, on the part of indigents to review of their convicthere can be few, if any constitutional rules as to tions.75 Subsequent cases involving the waiver of
6
when counsel has failed to defend adequately.n filing fees,7 the screening of appeals,77 and the
appointment
of appellate counsel78 were also deThe reason that ingenious counsel or sympathetic
cided
on
the
basis
of equalizing the plight of the
courts have been unable to develop the constitu"rich"
and
the
''poor"
in the criminal process.
tional principles or rules of ineffective counsel may
be because there is really little agreement as to All of these cases restate Justice Black's proposihow the constitutional function of counsel is to tion that the states are not constitutionally rebe defined. Or put in terms of decision-making, quired to provide appellate review of criminal
it is not clear what is the appropriate forum to convictions for anyone, rich or poor.79 It does
even raise the issue72 of ineffective assistance of appear illogical to insist upon constitutional access
counsel, not to mention develop the necessary con- for indigents to something-review of a convicstitutional doctrines. But more important is that tion-that is not constitutionally required for the
the other constitutional doctrines developed to rich and the poor alike.
The manner in which the apparent inconsistency
protect the notions of criminal law decision-making
may achieve the same functional results as any can be resolved is to recognize that there is a conproposed ineffective assistance of counsel doc- stitutional principle that requires that a convicted
trines. Yet in other decisions dealing with access individual must have an opportunity to litigate
to review of a conviction, there has been continu- the legitimacy of state control. The Court's failure
ous disagreement of the doctrinal origins of the to articulate this principle in the cases dealing with
principles and rules of access of review of a criminal access may be due to the fact that the Justices have
conviction. But once these cases are analyzed in been unable, even recently, to agree on a doctrinal
terms of the function of review, the conflict can
be resolved consistent with the theory of decision- 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, (1972) (holding
that there is no constitutional right to defend pro se)
making proposed.7a
with United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1138
£a Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
(1972) (Bazelon, C. J., concurring) (holding there
t 9 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
is). See also Faretta v. California, _U.S.__, 94 S. Ct.
7° That is, the Court is unwilling to consider Pro- 1559 (1974) (cert. granted).
74351 u.s. 12 (1956).
fessor Hazard's suggestion of making the process fair by
76 351 U.S. at 16-20.
eliminating lawyers for the state. Hazard, Rationing
76 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
Justice1 8 J. LAW AND EcoNOMICS 1, 8 (1965) [herein77 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
after crted as Hazard, Rationing Justice].
78 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
71 See, e.g., United States v. De Coster, 487 F.2d
79 Griffin v. illinois, 351 U.S. at 18; Draper v. Wash1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Beusley v. United States, 14
CRill. L. REP. 2427 {6th Cir. January 21, 1974); Coles v. ington, 372 U.S. at 456-500; Douglas v. California, 372
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. U.S. at 355-58; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. at 257-58. The
849 (1968); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 approach is criticized by Justice Harlan who dissents in
F.2d 976, 98~1 (7th Cir. 1948); Diggs v. Welsh, 148 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 29 and Douglas v. CaliF.2d Q67 (1945); People v. Washington, 41 ill. 2d 16, fornia, 372 U.S. at 360. The proposition that there is no
241 N.E. 425 (1968). See also Johnson v. Vincent, 14 constitutional right of appeal is also recited in Lindsey
CRill. L. REP. 2425 (S.D.N.Y. January 30, 1974) v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972); Monger v. Florida,
(ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).
405 U.S. 958 (1972) cert. denied, (Douglas, J., dissent72 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 55 ing); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
(1969).
73 A liberty due process analysis of Gideon's sixth and
An opportunity to re-examine the issue of a right of
appeal
may be forthcoming. See Ross v. Moffitt, 483
fourteenth amendment requirements is essential to the
resolution of the emerging issue of the right to proceed F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 415 U.S. 909
without counsel. Compare People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d (1974).
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basis for deciding any given access case.80 A variety
of due process and equal protection arguments
have been advanced to explain the result of any
given case.81 The failure to clearly establish the
principle on some fourteenth amendment ground
has been of no practical importance to the Court.
But the failure to make the analytical distinctions
requited by a recognition of the principle could
have important practical consequences to others
trying to meet the Court's many constitutional
requirements. By analogy, the failure to start with
the principle that every convicted individual is
entitled to review is like confusing the question of
whether everyone is entitled to a lawyer with the
issue of whether the state must provide lawyers
for those without resourc~ to pay for a laywer
within the criminal process.82 Analyzed in terms of
principles, implicit in the access cases is the rule
that a state prosecution must include at least one
opportunity for review of the conviction.
An integral and explicit part of the principle of
litigating the legitimacy of state control is the
requirement of a lawyer's assistance in a criminal
appeal. In Douglas v. Calijornia,83 decided the same
day as Gideon, the Court required the states to
provide the convicted person with a lawyer on his
first appeal-as-of-right. Justice Douglas, for the
majority, reasoned that the "poor" convicted person must have as "meaningful" an appeal as the
rich convicted person who could afford and utilize
the services of a lawyer. He reached the result
without any specification as to whether notions of
due process, equal protection, or some combination
of the two required the result.M Once again, it
should be apparent that the poor must be placed
on an equal footing to those with more resources
only because the rich have something that is fundamental-review with the assistance of a lawyer.
Making Douglas consistent with Griffin v.lllinois,85
the ''leading case," under the integrated analysis
requires only a traditional type of reconciliation
of the two cases. In Griffin, Justice Black suggested
8° See, e.g., Grifli.n v. lllinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 12 (Black, J.,
writing for the plurality).
81 Kamisar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in
Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Poluy Obseroations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 7-14 (1963).
See Mitchell v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349 {6th Cir.
·1973); Ross v. Moffitt, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. granted., 415 U.S. 909 (1974).
82 See text supra at 269.
83372 u.s. 353 {1963).
Mid.

85

351

u.s. 12 (1956).
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that the equalizing notion means the state courts
have to furnish a transcript unless "other means of
affording adequate appellate review to indigents"
are found.86 After Douglas, it is apparent that those
alternative means do not mean review absent the
participation of a lawyer in the appellate process.
Without reading Griffin and Douglas together to
delineate the underlying principle, the Court's
analysis would appear to allow the states the
option of eliminating lawyers in criminal appeals
for everyone.87 Under the integrated analysis, the
option does not exist. Rather the integrated analysis' explicit articulation of the principle makes it
easier to distinguish the problems of access in
criminal law from the problems of access in other
types of legal processes.88
More recent attempts to apply the Griffin rationale are not inconsistent with the above argument that a criminal prosecution requires some
minimal means of review. In Mayer v. Clzicago8 9
the unanimous Court held that an individual convicted and fined under a city ordinance was entitled to a record sufficient for access to review. 90
ss 351

U.S. at 20.
H the issue were ever raised, review of a criminal
conviction would be held to be a "fundamental" aspect
of the criminal process. Note, Tlze Supreme Court, 1962
Term, 77 HAR.v. L. REv. 62, 108 (1963). Cf. Texas v.
Pruett, 470 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1972), ajf'd, 414, U.S.
802 (1973). To arrive at such a result, the Court would
need two related theories. One important theoretical
consideration would be the functions appellate courts
should perform in the criminal process. Cf. L. ORPmLD,
CRIMINAL APPROACH (1939). The other consideration
woUld be a legal theory of access to review of a criminal
conviction. Either something like the Brennan or Harlan rationale could be used as a starting point for such
a theory. The Harlan rationale, however, should be preferred because his theory of due process takes account
of the allocation of judicial and other resources. Furthermore, when faced with the question of whether due
process requires some system of review, Harlan was the
only Justice to articulate a connection between requiring counsel and review of the initial determination. In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 72 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
See also Saltzburg, Tlze Harm of Harmless Error, 59
VA. L. REv. 988, 1028-29, 1028 n.148 (1973).
88 Counsel for the petitioners in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), were surprised that the Court
decided in their favor on an explicit due process ground.
LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor:
Boddie v. Connectuut, 1971 DUKE L. J 487. See also id.
at 52Q-21 n.153. See note 80 infra.
sg 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
oo A leading co=entator has suggested that the
more recent Argersinger incarceration-in-fact rule
means the Court might now view Mayer differently. L.
HALL, Y. KAM!sAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. IsRAEL, MoDERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 27 {Supp.Jan.1973).ButsuCh
al).alysis. fails to distinguish the issues of an opportunity
to defend from access to review.
87
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However, in Britt v. North Carolina, 91 which did
not involve access to review of a criminal conviction, the Court held that the denial of a transcript
of the defendant's first trial that ended in a mistrial was justified under the "narrow circumstances." While those circumstances were not
sufficiently different from cases where the Court
had required a transcript of a preliminary hearing, 92
for the two dissenters, Britt demonstrates the inherent difficulties of applying Griffin without a
clear articulation of its basic principles.9 3
Facing the issue in terms of access to review of
criminal convictions allows for a discussion of this
issue in terms of its limits-the problem of finality
of criminal convictions. Given a process that requires lawyers in the trial and appellate process,
the notion of "challenge" and litigation pervades
the system. 94 Yet every legal process must determine when the litigation has ended. For instance,
deciding when federal habeas corpus relief is available can be seen in terms of allocating the time of
counsel, the opportunity to defend, and the opportunity to review the guilt determination in the
state proceedings. 95 Despite the uncomfortableness of the suggestion, we must now recognize
Professor Hazard's suggestion that courts, legislatures, and now court administrators, are "ration91404

u.s. 226 (1972).

Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
ga As the equality notion of Griffin is expanded from
review stages, broadly defined, the equal protectiondue process dichotomy reappears. When the issue is
whether "indigents" can be jailed for failure to pay fines,
a unanimous court cannot agree on a. rationale. Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Dlinois, 399
U.S. 40 (1970). The confiict is even more dramatic when
the issue is the applicability or inapplicability of Griffit~
to the issue of filing fees to divorce cases. Justice Harlan,
for the majority, in Boddietv. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), cites and uses Griffin as a case dealing solely
with access to courts and the allocation of judicial resources. Id. at 382. Justice Black, the sole dissenter and
author of Griffin, thought its rationale wholly inapplicable to "civil" cases. Id. at 385-86. Concurring,
Justice Douglas reads Griffin as an equal protection
case dealing with a principle of invidious discrimination
based on poverty. Id. at 388. The other concurring
justice, Brennan, prefers a joint due process and equal
protection rationale of Griffin. He holds that a fee requirement for the indigent in a divorce case is a denial
of equal access to the courts. Id. at 390. Cf. Brickman,
Of Arterial Passageways through tlze Legal Process: Tire
Riglzt of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.UL. REv. 595 (1973); Michelman, Tlze
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Riglzt to
Protect One's Riglrt's-Part I, 1973 DUKE L. J. 1153
g2

(1973).

at 204.-38.
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 250,
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
Pi

pACKER, LIMITS

P5

411

u.s. 475 (1973).
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ing justice" 96 in terms of particular views of the
competence of counsel at trial or pre-trial stages,
and the ability of an appellate court to review
guilt determination with or without counsel's
active participation.97

C. The Principle of Advocacy in Review
of Criminal Convictions
Until Anders v. Calijomia98 the Court had managed to avoid explicit discussion of the principle
originating in Gideon in a case purporting to deal
solely with the Griffin lines of cases. As noted
previously, the rule requiring appointed counsel
on appeals, although decided on the same day as
Gideon, relied solely upon Griffin. 99 Justice Clark
combined the two lines of cases in Amlers in deciding that appointed appellate counsel could not
file a "no merit" letter rather than a brief on the
merits without explicit exposition.100 Acting on the
assumption that the convicted person had a lawyer to defend him because of theprincipleof Gideon,
the Court had implicitly assumed that there might
be an argnable issue for appellate review. This
assumption is reinforced by the Court's requirement of appointment of appellate counsel under
the principle of Griffin. But to put these implicit
assumptions into an integrated theory, Anders
should be recognized as establishing a third principle of criminal law decision-making. That principle is that counsel in a criminal appeal has the
obligation of advocacy. As a new principle, Anders
is the starting point for integrating the functions
of appellate courts and counsel in criminal law.
While the opinion in Anders is replete with referHazard, Rationing Justice, supra note 70.
rn Limiting access to federal review of the voluntariness of guilty pleas is apparently dependent on the
assumption that counsel performs his obligation to
defend. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970). The obligation to defend includes, in at least
Justice White's view, the obligation to litigate the voluntariness of a confession along the available avenues.
At the time of the plea in question, Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 {1964), was not the law. Underlying Justice
White's analysis is a further assumption that defense
lawyers will not allow individuals with conceivable legal
defenses (i.e. suppression of a confession that leads to
lack of evidence for the jury to convict) to plead guilty.
If subsequent analysis or research proves White's assumptions erroneous, the present acceptance of guilty
pleas and the bargain model of criminal law. See, e.g.,
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 495 (1971), will be
brought into question. See also discussion in text infra
p. 281.
Ps

98 386

u.s. 738 {1967).

99 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
lOD 386 U.S. at 742-45.
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ences to notions of advocacy for the indigent/01
neither the opinion nor subsequent discussions
clearly articulate that the Court has established a
new principle.
Most discussions of Anders have improperly
assumed that the major issue left open for resolution after Anders is the definition of a "frivolous
appeal." 1 02 Such discussions are misguided since
the Court's statement that counsel can request
withdrawal if the claim is "wholly frivolous," 1oa
is only one rule to implement the more general
principle of advocacy.l04
A critical examination of Anders' companion
case, Entsmi1tger v. Iowa,I 05 will demonstrate that
establishing the principle of advocacy is Anders'
major innovation. Despite a court order to :file a
full record, briefs, and be prepared for oral argument, counsel simply :filed a "clerk's transcript." 1os
The state court's short per curiam affirmance of
the conviction was inadequate primarily because
appellate counsel failed to take advantage of the
appellate procedures available.107 Mter Entsminger
there is no rule that says "clerk's transcript" or
that "no merit letters" are per se unconstitutional.
Rather the constitution prohibits the use of either
procedure in such a way as to inhibit or encourage
appellate counsel to abandon his obligation of
advocacy.108
Clarifying the underlying principle of Anders is
only the beginning of the appellate courts' job.
But given such clarification, courts should be aware
101 386 U.S. at 741-42.
102Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 701 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hermann,
Frivolous Appeals]; Note, Screening of Criminal Cases in
tlze Federal Courts of Appeal: Practice and Proposals, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 77 (1973).
103 386 U.S. at 744.
104 I d.
105 386 u.s. 748 (1967).
106386 U.S. at 750.
101386 U.S. at 752.
1oa See, e.g., MISSOURI STAT. ANN., Rules of Criminal
Procedure § 29.01(c) (1969). After Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) was decided, the Missouri
supreme court amended its rules to require appointment of counsel for indigents who wish to appeal.
Gerard, Tlze Right to Counsel in Missouri: A Limited
Inquiry, into the Factual and Theoretical Underpinnings
of Douglas v. California, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 463, 464
and n.4 {1965). Under the present rules appointed
appellate counsel is required to submit a brief which
modifies one appellate route available in Missouri before Douglas and Anders, that of appeal by means of a
motion for a new trial for which no brief is required.
ld. at 465. It is Gerard's thesis generally that the
motion for a new trial procedure did not adequately
provide the indigent appellant with the resources of
counsel.
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of the wide range of combinations of rules that
might effectuate the principle. Careful examination of any proposed rule will reveal wide ramifications for the appellate courts' relationship to other
institutions. For instance, in formulating a rule to
implement Anders, a court must make judgments
about the general quality of counsel in its jurisdiction. In some specific situations courts might
need to consider in addition the effect of a statewide system as compared with other arrangements
for providing legal services to the indigent.l09
Overall, however, the failure of most courts to
see and address issues like those outlined above
has led to some misuses of the Anders principle.
Without critical examination of the appellate
courts, counsel, and the rules of appellate procedure in a given jurisdiction, there may be a tendency of courts and commentators to see contradictions in the law where in fact none exists. Also, a
court may improperly assume that the major issue
left open for resolution after Anders is under what
circumstances can appellate counsel withdraw.l1°
Armed with an inadequate analysis of Anders,
courts may go beyond constitutional principles in
attempts to deal with the problems of advocacy.111
For example, the California courts at one time
went beyond the requirements of advocacy. In In
re KetclzelJ12 the court required that the defendant
receive a psychiatric examination on the theory
that appellate counsel might use the expert information to develop a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.113 While the court thought
the spirit of Anders required such a result,11 4 it
failed to consider whether its notion of the obligation of advocacy went beyond any theory of defense offered at trial.11 5 Anders requires that appellate counsel, as an advocate, argue every issue
that might be in the record. But the court is incorrect in assuming that Anders provides guidance
for what are the proper rules of appellate procedure. Given the operation of the California appelto9 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A (1971);
Trebach, A Modern Defender System for New Jersey, 12
RuTGERS L. REv. 289 (1957).
11o See, e.g., Barber v. State, 471 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971).
w Throughout all of these proposed solutions is the
uneasy feeling that appellate counsel cannot withdraw.
Cf. Doherty, Wolf! Wolj!-Tlze Ramifications of Frivolous Appeals, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1968).
112 68 Cal. 2d 397, 438 P.2d 625, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881
(1968).
113 I d. at 401, 438 P.2d at 628, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
114 I d. at 402, 438 P.2d at 629, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
mId. at 403-06, 438 P.2d 629-31, 66 Cal. Rptr. at
885-87, (dissenting opinion).
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late courts, the court might legitimately want to
have higher standards than Anders, but those
standards should be stated as such.116
More recent discussions interpreting Anders in
California have focused on the issue of protecting
effective appeal. In In Re Banks,111 a state habeas
corpus proceeding, the appellate court held that
the petitioner had been denied his right of "effective advocacy by appellate counsel." 118 The case
is a curious one since the petitioner's involvement
in the various state and federal review mechanisms
spanned nearly a ten year period.119 The attempt
to obtain the effective advocacy eventually required by the court involved three trips to the
United States Supreme Court and numerous requests for appointment of different appellate
counsel.l2° The Court went on to hold that the
petitioner's constitutional rights had been violated
in his 1962 trial by the prosecution's comments
upon his refusal to take the stand. In deciding to
115 See, e.g., In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969,
90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (the kind of arguments an active
appellate advocate could and should make are outlined
in the opinion).
117 4 Cal. 3d 337, 482 P.2d 215, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591
(1971).
118 Id. at 340, 482 P.2d at 217, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
nv mstory of the appeals of In re Banks: 1. August
9, 1962 judgment was entered on two counts of robbery
and one count of attempted robbery. Petitioner had
conducted his own defense. 2. Petitioner filed a timely
appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Court-appointed
appellate counsel received several continuances and two
requests from the clerk of the court to file a brief. Finally, over a year later, a twenty three page brief was
:filed. The brief cited only two cases. In 1964 the strongest appellate argument was denial of counsel at trial,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and yet
the case was not cited. Counsel then dropped the case
and wrote to petitioner, but did not send the court a
no-merit letter as required. See In re Nash, 61 Cal.
2d 491, 393 P.2d 405, 39 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1964). 3. Petitioner sought relief in propria persona. The United
States Supreme Court vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965). Banks v. California, 382 U.S. 420 (1966). 4.
Petitioner requested appointment of different counsel,
but the court of appeals denied his request. It informed
counsel he might brief and present oral argument.
However, Counsel did not submit a brief, or motion,
and did not appear to argue the case. Court of appeals
affirmed. 5. Petitioner sought relief again in propria
persona. The United States Supreme Court vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Banks v. California, 387 U.S. 92 {1967). 6. Court of Appeals again
affirmed. 7. Banks petitioned the United States Supreme Court a third time. Certiorari was dismissed for
petitioner's failure to petition the California supreme
court for a hearing. Banks v. California, 395 U.S. 708
(1969). 4 Cal. 3d at 340-42, 341 n.1, 593 n.1, 482 P.2d
at 217-18, 217 n.1, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94.
:120
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consider the merits in this collateral proceeding,
the court had to decide why its usual remedy of
reinstating the appeal did not apply to the case.
Two factors moved the court to decide the case
on the merits. One factor was "conservation of
scarce judicial resources." The other was the able
advocacy of the newly appointed counsel.121 The
court failed, however, to discuss whether its disposition of the case would have prevented the
numerous appeals cases at hand or in future cases.
The long range resolutions of the problem of
numerous appeals lies in the California courts'
effective use of the "Anders Brief." It is a brief
required by the Court in Anders, consisting of any
arguable points with citations to the record and
relevant cases that must be filed before counsel
can withdraw.122 The California rule of allowing
withdrawal of counsel after a full discussion of all
the issues in the record and deciding to dismiss an
appeal as "frivolous" is the rule used by most
states.
Another solution to numerous appeals is to use
the apparently contradictory rule of not allowing
appointed counsel to withdraw.123 Those states
forcing counsel to file appellate briefs rather than
"Anders Briefs" may have different views as to
the best allocation of the resources of counsel,
time spent on direct appeal review, and time spent
on collateral review of conviction. Both rules permit appellate courts to perform their function of
reviewing a conviction with the aid of counsel.m
What then appears to be a conflict between
courts allowing the Anders briefs and those requiring appellate briefs is only two different rules to
enforce the obligation of advocacy. The real' conflict in the case law has developed as a result of
the failure of some courts to see that the appellate
courts, rather than lawyers, must administer any
rules. In an attempt to prevent the ''Brief Against
the Client," 125 one court has tried to admonish
appointed counsel to imagine that he were being
paid in deciding whether to withdraw.126 However,
W.Id. at 343, 482 P.2d at 219-20, 93 Cal. Rptr. at

595-96.

122 See, e.g., People v. Feggans, 67 Cal. 2d 444, 432
P.2d 21, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1967).
m Dixon v. State, 284 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. Ct. App.
1972); McClendon v. People, 481 P.2d 715 (Colo.
1971); State v. Gates, 466 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1971);
State v. Cheelester, 26 Utall 2d 300, 488 P.2d 1045
{1971).
124 See notes 108, 109 and 117 sttjJra.
125 Suggs v. United States, 391 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
126 I d. at 977-78 {appendix).
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such a rule encourages counsel to consider for
himself if the appeal is likely to succeed. Furthermore, the standard ignores the possibility that at
a certain point of lack of probability of success, a
paying client will decline to pursue an appeal.
Even prior to Anders the federal statutory scheme
for indigent appeals had been interpreted as preventing lawyers from deciding who gains access to
review.127 Once a judicial officer has issued a certificate of probable cause,128 the question of whether
to pursue the appeal has ended. The case ought to
be argued in the appellate court on the basis of
any conceivable point in the record.
Lawyers seem peculiarly aware of the fact that
appeals to the indigent are costless and thus from
the indigent's point of view every appeal ought to
be pursued.129 Yet, lawyers like to "win" appeals
and may "resent" the suggestion that they are
bound only to make the appellate arguments that
support the defense presented below. Such a requirement on appellate counsel puts in proper
perspective two problems generated by Anders.
The first of these problems is appellate counsel's
obligation when the client pled guilty but has
appealed. Under the proposed analysis, the answer
is a choice between two options dependent upon
the goals of the particular appellate courts. Either
the plea was involuntary in the sense that present
constitutional standards or the state's own standards were no-t observed in receiving the plea;130 or
counsel can simply inform the court that there is
no appellate argument to be made because there
was no defense made out below.131 The appellate
court must determine which option it prefers. The
first option would be important to an appellate
court seriously interested in scrutinizing plea bargaining with an eye towards some reform.132 The
Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
28 U.S.C.A. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
R.24; Third Cir. R.7B.
129 Hermann, Frivolous Appeals, at 701; A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE
STANDARDS RELATED TO CRIMINAL APPEALS 63-64
(Approved Draft 1970).
1ao See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969);
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); cf.
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 434 Pa. 423, 253 A.2d 258
(1969) (holding that a psychiatric examination is not
required before plea of guilty is accepted).
131 See, e.g., People v. Barrios, 1 Til. App. 3d 1029,
274 N.E.2d 662 (1971); People v. Grant, 1 Til. App. 3d
658, 274 N.E.2d 603 (1971); People v. Bell, 130 Til.
App. 2d 791, 267 N.E.2d 367 (1971); People v. Carter,
92 Til. App. 2d 120, 235 N.E.2d 382 (1968); Commonwealth v. Sparks, 438 Pa. 77, 263 A.2d 414 (1970).
132 National Commission on Goals & Policies of
Criminal Law chaired by Gov. Peterson recommended
127

128
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second option may be adopted by a court willing
to await federal constitutional developments by,
in effect, forcing the defendant to pursue collateral
attack in both state and federal courts.133
The other major problem to be noted, especially
in those jurisidictions that disallow the "Anders
Brief," is what appellate counsel should do with
the trial record without any "good" arguments.134
The manner in which appellate courts should
construe this issue is whether counsel below made
out a defense at all. Courts should distinguish two
kinds of cases. One is where appellate counsel
dislikes the arguments or defense strategy presented at trial or considers them lacking in merit.
The others are situations where apparently no
defense was presented.135 In the first kinds of cases
appellate courts should force appellate counsel to
be advocates. In the latter cases, appellate counsel
should present a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.
Such a claim by appellate counsel should not be
viewed as an occasion for disciplinary action
against trial counsel.136 Rather, raising the issue
gives the appellate court an opportunity to scrutinize the actual quality of trial counsel. Such
scrutiny by appellate courts is the starting point
of the development of a doctrine of effective assistance of trial counsel based on the obligation to
defend. Until an appellate court has started to
assess the quality of counsel in criminal cases
generally, however, there should be no haste to
develop a new ill-defined constitutional doctrine
of effective assistance.137 Also an appellate court
may be achieving functionally what is meant by
"effective assistance" of counsel by enforcing both
eliminating plea bargaining in the next 10 years. The
California supreme court may be indicating a willingness to scrutinize the plea bargaining process. People v.
Martin, 9 Cal. 3d. 687, 511 P.2d 1161, 108 Cal. Rptr.
809 (1973).
133 State v. Borough, 279 Minn. 199 n.2, 156 N.W.
2d 757, 759 n.2 (1968).
134Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 703.
135 United States v. Camodeo, 367 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.
1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 575, aff'd, 383
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967) (although arguably the government's failure to produce a witness was an error but the
error was not preserved by defense counsel).
13 6 Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Ejficiet1t" Courts in a
Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 653, 671 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Bazelon, Efficient Courts].
137 Bazelon, Tire Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42
U. Crn. L. REv. 1 (1973); Bines, Remedying Ineffective
Representation in Crimi11al Cases: Departure from
Habeas Corptts, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Bines,· Ineffective Representation].
See also United States v. De Costa, 487 F.2d 1197
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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an obligation to defend at trial and an obligation
of advocacy on appeal.
Some of the recommendations of the organized
bar are really contrary to the underlying principles
of Anders. The suggestion that counsel can waive
oral argument if the appeal is not meritorious133
will encourage lawyers to effectuate that which a
unanimous court condemned in Entsminger--an
inadequate appeal. If oral argument is not necessary, court rules can accommodate this problem
by placing the case on a summary calendar.139 In
this manner the court makes the basic decision of
access to appellate review and the quality of that
review.

II.

TERMINATING REVIEW AND "SPEEDY
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the doctrines of right to counsel and access to review are in the federal constitution, innovations in
the area are likely to be matters of federal law. A
disastrous effect of the failure to analyze Anaers
for federal courts may be an attempt to debate and
decide issues which will prove non-productive.
Third, federal courts are already equipped with
the resources, in terms of personnel and functional
definitions, that make them particularly appropriate for a study of the functions of appellate courts.
Because of recent legislation authorizing a research
function as part of the federal appellate courts,141
these courts are uniquely situated to ask and
answer questions about the relationship of counsel
and the review function in crintinal law.

DISPOSITIONS" OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

A. Advocacy in Federal Courts

While the principle of advocacy applies equally
to federal and state cases, its application in federal
cases raises three significant issues not clearly discernible in an examination of state court response
to Anders. The review function of federal courts
in crintinallaw differs significantly from that function in state courts. When the federal court, as a
habeas corpus court, reviews a state conviction,
the court may need to consider the previous opportunities for review.140 Second, since the origins of

The difference in review function of federal and
state courts in criminal law cannot be described
merely in terms of relative breadth. Federal courts
review not only federal criminal convictions but
also state criminal convictions after state appellate review has determined that conviction and
confinement of the individual is prima facie legitimate. As to the latter function of reviewing state
convictions, the convicted individual can invoke
federal judicial process of review \vithout a lawyer.142 Also, federal courts have increased access
to review through liberalized pleading for state
prisoners143 and liberal construction of the federal
habeus corpus statute.144 At the same time the
courts have developed "screening devices" to limit
access to review.145 An often suggested solution to
unlimited access is to appoint a lawyer for the pro
se litigant in federal court.146 However well-meaning the suggestion, if adopted, lawyers will become
the screeners or the deniers of access to review.

m Waiver of oral argument and submission of a
brief was proposed by the ABA Advisory Co=ittee on
Sentencing and Review. The Full House of Delegates
rejected the Advisory Committee's draft on this point.
Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 703 n.12. However, such
a route is suggested for appeals without issues of substance as distinguished from frivolous appeals. ABA
PROJECT ON M1Nn.rtm STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JusTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS
5 (Approved draft 1970) § 3.2 b(ii) provides:
If the client wishes to proceed it is better£or counsel
to present the case, so long as his advocacy does
not involve deception or misleading the court.
After preparing and filing a brief on behalf of the
client, counsel may appropriately suggest that the
case be submitted on briefs or request permission
to witlzdraw, (underlining added to tentative draft}.
See also co=entary, I d. at 6.
139 Fifth Cir. Rule 18; Third Cir. Rule 12(e). See also
NLRB v. Local No. 42, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos \Vkrs., 476 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.
1973); Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co. of
N.Y., 431 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1970); Murphy v. Houma
Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1969}; Huth v. S.
Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1969} (summary disposition without oral argument). The Supreme Court
has denied certiorari to review the fifth and fourth
circuit screening procedures. United States v. Ambers,
416 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1969}, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1039
(1970); In re Louisiana Loan & Thrift Corp., 416 F.2d
898 {5th Cir. 1969}, cert. denied sub 1Jom. Holohan v.
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); Pluchino v. United
States, 410 U.S. 958 (1973) (cert. denied).
uo Friendly, Is bmoce11ce Iffelevantf Collateral Attack

on Crimina! J1ldgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970).
[hereinafter cited as FriendlyI. Collateral Attack].
m 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (19t0} (Federal Judicial Center).
xusee, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
143 Cj. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
144 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 {1963).
146 Note, Screening of Criminal Cases i1: t/ze Federal
Courts of Appeals: Practice and Proposals, 73 Couru.
L. REv. 77 (1973). See also 28 U.S. C. § 636(b) (3) {1970)
which authorized district courts to use United States
magistrates to screen post-conviction applications.
"The additional duties authorized by rule may include,
but are not restricted to ... (3) preliminary review of
applications for post trial relief made by individuals
convicted of crinlinal offenses.... "
146 But see Zeigler & Hermann, T!te ImJisible Litigant:
An Inside View of ProSe Litigation in t!te Federal Courts,
47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 157, 250 (1972).
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The federal courts must recognize that it is macy of state control. Such a delineation is disbetter for state prisoners to have access to federal tinct from the position of some commentators and
review of a conviction without lawyers. In the judges who see the right to counsel and access cases
first place if the convicted person bas proceeded as part of a social welfare movement.162
at trial and at least one appeal with a lawyer, be
Once the constitutional doctrines of counsel and
is hoping to obtain relief where the combined access are seen as juridical rights or matters of
efforts of two lawyers have failed.147 Second, if judicial principles and rules, federal courts are in
the petition lacks merit, it is the federal court's the position to eradicate the differential standards
responsibility to say so and make the difficult between retained and appointed counsel.1 53 If
determination of when a given piece of criminal there is one constitutional standard of performance
litigation is final. The federal courts must develop of counsel, judicial decisions will be dealing dilegal doctrines that limit access in order to prevent rectly with the troublesome questions of who gets
lawyers from making the determination of when what kind of legal services in the criniinal process.
criminal litigation is final.I 48 Finally, the federal The line of "indigency" is not a static economic
court's ability to make the determination of final- level that a rule establishes. For instance, dependity will be a function of its ability to enforce the ing upon one's use of resources for trial counsel,
obligation of advocacy in the state courts.149
one may be indigent for purposes of appeal. Courts
In one sense the federal courts, in their review should not shrink from these troublesome issues
of criminal convictions, have created the "law of the marginal defendants, i.e. those who do not
explosion" or the emphasis on "legality" 1 50 in meet standards of indigency but cannot afford full
criminal law. And as the source of any further access to review.1 54
Addressing the problems does not mean the
doctrinal developments on access to review or
counsel in the criminal law, the federal courts are courts would resolve every issue in terms of
in the position to clarify the emerging issues of whether or not the decision favors the indigent.
delivery of legal services in the criminal process. Instead the courts should be aware of the allocaForemost in this clarification should be an in- tive effect of any of its decisions. For example, the
sistence that the provision of counsel in the crim- unresolved issue of whether it is permissible to
inal process is a "juridical right" as opposed to a require some form of repayment from those who
"social welfare right." 151 Cast as a juridical right, have had counsel appointed in criniinal cases is a
counsel is required whenever the state seeks to much broader issue than indigency.155 Appointing
impose its criniinallabel through prosecution. After counsel with little inquiry into true ability to pay
the prosecution the individual is entitled to at may make counsel more readily available to all
least one review with a lawyer to insure the legiti- those charged with crimes. Bearing in mind that
this service, at apparent zero cost to the defendant,
147 Cf. United States v. O'Clair, 451 F.2d 485, 486
(1st Cir. 1971) (holding that appellant is not entitled is a cost that must be born by someone, a court
to appointment of different counsel who presumably might determine that a system of recoupment of
would be willing to serve as mouilipiece for petitioners
some of the funds is permissible. The degree to
own arguments).
148 Schnecklotli v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 250,
{1973) (Powell, J., concurring); See also Friendly,

Collateral Attack.
149 Cj. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).

LIMITS at 232-36.
Cappelletti & Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Tltemes
and Variations, 24 STAN. L. REv. 347 (1972). The auiliors suggest iliat in ilie nineteentli century legal aid
was a combination of juridical right and charity. ld.
at 387. Legal aid as a juridical right is also present in
20tli century schemes. One feature of legal aid as a
juridical right is its emphasis on individual rights and
responsiblities. As contrasted witli ilie social welfare
approach, a program of aid as a juridical right "only
coincidentally attacks problems iliat transcend individual interests or capacities." Id. at 393. Cj. E.
FRIESEN, E. GALLAS & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE
CoURTS 49 (N.Y. 1971); Burger, Counsel for t!te Prose160 pACKER,

161

cution and Defense-Their Roles under t!te Minimmn
Standards, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 2, 3 (1969).

152 E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 814 (1963);
Griffin v. lllinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Bazelon,
Tlze Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv.
1 {1973); Pye, The Administration of Criminal Justice,
66 CoLUM. L. REv. 286, 301-03 (1966).
1 63 Compare West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5tli
Cir. 1973) (holding ilie standard of effectiveness of
retained counsel is ilie san1e standard as iliat for appointed counsel) with United States ex rel. O'Brien v.
Maroney, 423 F.2d 865 {3d Cir. 1970) (holding iliere is
a different standard for retained counsel). See gemwally
Bines, Ineffective Representation at 982.
154 D. OAXS & W. LERMAN, A CRIMINAL JusTICE
SYSTEM ANn THE INDIGENT 150-51 (1968).
166 James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). As tliis
article was about to go to print, the Court upheld a
state statute requiring ilie convicted indigent defendant
to repay ilie cost of counsel when he becan~e financially
able. Fuller v. Oregon,_ U.S._, 94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974).
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which some persons might forego counsel because
of possible recoupment might be balanced by others
using the appointed system when their "indigency"
is in doubt. The foregoing of counsel by some and
the appointing of counsel where indigency is uncertain would be desirable if the court thought the
lawyers operating under its, appointive system were
better than the average private attorney engaged
in criminal practice.
The presence of lawyers throughout the criminal
process has begun to generate new kinds of public
policy issues.156 What kinds of controls will most
likely make the decision-making of lawyers conform to the constitutional purposes for requiring
their presence? Where the appellate court is attempting to control a large public defender organization, the court would be trying to control a
bureaucracy, not a disparate group of individual
lawyers. Mixed systems of appointed private
lawyers and public defenders are simply variations
on this theme.157 Providing funds for counsel and
the organization of the public defender is a legislative response to the judicial creation of the requirement of counsel in the criminal process.163
The federal appellate court is in a unique position to recognize the existence of the new institution of counsel. As an appellate court it performs
the function of asking questions of itself and other
agencies about the criminal law.159 Congress has
strengthened this role by allowing for the appointment of a court executive,I6° one of whose functions
is to engage in research.161 Viewing the federal
156 John v Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (holding that there is a qualified judicial
immunity for the public defender); Wallace v. Kern,
481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied,_U.S._, 94 S.
Ct. 879 (1974) (holding that the public defender as an
association does not act under color of state law for the
purposes of an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)). The second circuit case may involve a more
complex issue since the district court judge had ordered
a certain case load for the legal aid attorneys in New
York City; Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
m 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1970). Cj. D. OAKS & W.
LEimAN, Clm.nNAL JusTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT
at 165.
lf8 See, United States v. Thompson, 361 F. Supp. 879
(D.D.C. 1973). Cf. In re Defender Association, 13
CRIM. L. REP. 2405 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 7/2/73) {upholding
city of Philadelphia appointments to board of Defender
Association which is in part run with city funds).
159 Bazelon, Ejficimt Courts at 655.
IEO 28 U.S. C. § 332(e) (1970).
16128 U.S.C. § 332(e) (6) & (7) provides that the
court executives' duties may include: "Conducting
studies relating to the business and administration of
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court's review function in its broadest sense creates
a new task for the court executive. He must :first
distinguish the unique features of criminal litigation in federal courts before he develops overall
court management policies.162 Professor Packer's
thesis about the connection of counsel and review
should be the starting point of his research endeavors. As the official researcher, the executive
must translate Packer's thesis into testable hypotheses that relate his management recommendations to the goal of enforcing the obligation of
advocacy. Any given federal circuit, as well as the
circuits together,I 63 provide the laboratory for
testing the probable impact of some legal innovations.
The series of questions that a court executive
might ask could begin with a question of court
management that leads to larger issues of delivery
of legal services. As to simple methods of docketing
cases, the executive might ask if the cases are
categorized in such a way that the various review
functions of federal courts can be studied separately and integrally.164 As to the usual function
of direct review of criminal convictions, the executive might ask if various federal districts within
the circuit have different systems of providing
counsel.165 If so, a basis of comparison exists for
testing by some criteria the best way of supplying
counsel at trial and on direct appeal. If, for instance, over a large number of cases it were found
that appeals from one federal district took longer,
or resulted in more reversals than appeals from
another district, a host of other questions are now
ready to be addressed. Was the system of appointing counsel on appeal the same for cases in both
districts? Or does the make-up and complexion of
the courts within the circuit...." and "Collecting,
compiling, and analyzing statistical data...."
162 For a characterization of the court executive as
manager and a description of managerial duties see
Statement of Ernest Frieson, Jr., Hearings on a Bill to
Provide for tlze Appointment of an Administrator of tlte
Courts for Eaclt J1Ulicial Circuit before tlze Smale Subcomm. on Improvemmts in Judicial Machinery of t!te
Committee on lite Jt«liciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., July
25, 1968, p. 290. See also Statement of Edward C.
Gallas, Id. at 303 (research projects of the administra-

tor).
163 28 U.S. C. § 331 (1970) (section on Judicial Conference of the United States includes provision for
making comprehensive survey of U.S. courts).
m Cf. Haworth, Screming a11tl Smnmary Procedures
in tlze United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 257, 277-79 (1973) (identifying habeas corpus
actions and distinguishing them from other civil actions).
16518 U.S. C. § 3006A(a) (1970).
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the bar in each district explain the difference? researcher, the executive must present his proWhat other research would be appropriate in the posed research to the judicial council for predistrict courts to clarify the problem? And finally, research review. His ability to design his research
what kinds of recommendations, e.g., changes in in terms of legal doctrines will increase his impact.
rules of appellate procedure versus the standards Furthermore, preview of research by the court
for effective assistance of counsel are appropriate before it is undertaken will help to determine the
given the kind of research being undertaken?166
scope of the executive's recommendations. For
Through a set of similar questions the court reasons peculiar to the judges, the court might
executive should compare the expenditure of ap- determine that modification of rules might be an
pellate resources on direct federal criminal appeals appropriate goal of research but that legal docto the expenditure of resources in collateral review trines as to effective assistance of counsel are
of state convictions_Hi7 Once again the problem not.170 Realistically, as an arm of the court, the
might start with a simple directive to change the executive can only be as innovative as the pardocketing of cases so that the state of origin of a ticular federal circuit court of appeals that he
case on collateral attack is readily identifiable. serves. But his overall performance as court manaMore pertinent questions might go to the nature ger will be improved if he recognizes the unique
of direct review of criminal cases and collateral features of criminal law in his policy formulations.
review in the states in the circuit. For instance,
B. "Speedy Dispositions" of Criminat Appeals
are there significant differences in the quantity and
quality of federal review required in states with
Research, including the process of posing and
elaborate post-conviction statutes168 as compared resolving questions, takes time during a period
with those without such provisions? One might when expediting or speeding up the work of appelassume that the state without an elaborate col- late courts is assumed to be the most important
lateral review mechanism generates more work for common goal. One answer to this objection is to
federal courts. But if the state with a minimum simply postulate that time is a commodity input
level of collateral review has an effective system of the appellate courts' efficient output in criminal
of appeals and an effective public defender system, law. Deciding how long criminal appeals take will
the absence of presence of elaborate state col- ultimately require allocative decisions by appellateral attack procedures may not be significant.189 late courts, but a complete answer must go further.
Such a result would support the overall thesis of
First, the courts must realize that lawyers and
this article that the time spent on review of crim- judges are more likely to define the issue of "time"
inal convictions in federal courts is a function of as the issue of "delay." Given the status of the
counsel at the original trial, effectiveness of coun- absence of delay in trial as the fundamental right
sel on appeal, and thus the effectiveness of appel- to a speedy trial,171 lawyers have every incentive
late courts.
to argue that delay on appeal is some type of
A more sophisticated study might include a "fundamental individual interest," a violation of
study of the work of another arm of some federal which would entitle defendants to certain remedies
appeals court, the prose clerk. The executive might from the appellate courts. This tendency will be
examine what happens to those cases that are reinforced by the Supreme Court's most recent
screened out by the pro se clerk. As the official pronouncement that the only remedy available for
denial of a speedy trial is dismissal of the indict166 Statistics will affect the constitutional outcome of
cases. Cj. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
ment.172 If this reasoning by analogy173 approach
167Actions taken under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) are
17° For reasons peculiar to the judges, they may not
not discussed in the article but the analysis would be
want to authorize research aimed at modifications of
generally applicable.
168 It might be useful to compare the outcome of
difficult constitutional issues involving complex value
federal cases originating in a state like New Jersey judgments. See, e.g., Burchard, Lawyers, Political Sciwhich has only one appeal as a matter of right, see N.J. entists, Sociologists-and Concealed Microphones, 23 AM.
Rules Governing Criminal Practice, Rule 3 :22-3, with SociOLOGICAL REv. 686, 687 in J. KATZ, EXPERIMENthe outcome of cases originating in Pennsylvania which TATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 103 (N.Y. 1972).
171 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Dickey v.
provides counselled collateral attacks on the criminal
judgment. See Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 426 Pa. Florida, 397 U.S. 30 (1970).
172 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
226,232 A.2d 629 (1967).
173 E.g., Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts
169 New Jersey appellate courts may have more means
of insuring vigorous appeals through its inherent rule- of Appeals: The Threat to tlte Ftmction of Review and
making power. E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS, & N. GALLAs, tlze National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 575-76 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Carrington, Crowded Dockets].
MANAGING THE COURTS at 31-35.
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to the appellate process is adopted, the problem
for research will be defined as one of "delay." 174
The solutions proposed will all be similarly aimed
at eliminating the problem of "delay" or "undue
delay" that is harmful to some assumed proper
functioning of appellate courts.175
However, viewing the issue broadly in terms of
the different functions of trial and appeals in criminal law, time performs different functions in the
two aspects of criminal adjudication. At least one
member of the Supreme Court has indicated that
the constitutional delay analysis in criminal trials
is not applicable to the appellate process.176 This
distinction is of constitutional significance because
delay at trial interferes with the overall presumption of innocence,177 which is part of the due process
analysis of a fair trial. As such, given a particular
theory of due process of law, a concept of delay of
trial might be integrated into the notion of a right
to defend.178
Time can be defined in terms of appellate functions in criminal law. Such a definition requires
that the legal presumption for an appellate court
analysis of the effect of time is the reverse of that
of the trial court in criminal law. Rather than
assume that a person is innocent, the appellate
court is entitled to assume he is guilty. Therefore,
the primary question for appellate courts is whether
the convicted appellant has been rightfully convicted and is legitimately under the control of
government officials. Such an articulation of the
issue clarifies the meaning of legality of guilt determination in tile new emphasis on review of
criminal convictions. Furthermore, such an emphasis on legality in review determinations means
17f ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS
3 (1970); Christian, Delay in Criminal Appeals, A
Fmzctional Analysis of One Court's Work, 23 STAN. L.
REv. 676 (1971); Fleming, The Law's Delay: Tlze
Dragotz Slaitt Friday Breathes Fire Agaitz Monday, 32
PUBLIC INTEREsT 13 (1973); Scwab & Geddes, Expediting Disposition of Criminal Appeals in Oreg01z, 51
ORE. L. REv. 650 (1972). Co=ent, Appellate Delay in
Crimittal Cases, 2 AM. CRm. L.Q. 150 (1964); Note,
Screettittg of Criminal Cases in tlze Federal Courts of
Appeals, 73 CoLmr. L. REv. 77 (1973).
11s I d.
176 Dickey

v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 43 n.4 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
177 See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. at 41 (Brennan,
J., concurring): "The evils at which the clause is directed are readily identified. It is intended to spare an
accused those penalties and disabilities-incompatible
with the presumption of innocence-that may spring
from delay in the crinlinal process." Cf. Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 527 and n.27; In re Winship, 397
u.s. 358 (1970).
178 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522-30 (1972).
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tllat appellate courts sometimes pursue goals of
the criminal law that have nothing to do with the
individual litigant before it.
The alleged relationship between "delay" in
criminal appeal dispositions and the interference
with other goals of criminal law is minimized by
determining that the legality of the guilt determination is to be viewed as the major functio~
of criminal appeals. For instance, it is often asserted that delay in appellate disposition "dilutes
deterrence or interferes witll whatever rehabilitative treatment that may be available." 179 The
assertion is based on two unspoken assumptions
about how the multiple goals of the criminal law
are pursued. First, the statement assumes implicitly that review of a criminal conviction does
not further some important goals of criminal law.
In this regard the assertion ignores the fact that
criminal adjudication, including appellate review,
is tile manner in which the values of the criminal
law are articulated.180 Second, the statement assumes that whatever penal policy is compromised
by criminal adjudication is wortll more to the
appellate courts tllan the time required for review.
The latter assumption seems particularly unwarranted since the lack of appellate review of
sentencing, and thus of penal policy, is what presently distinguishes sentencing from most other
criminal law decisions, particularly the determination of guilt. The effect of time spent on criminal
appeals on penal policy under present analysis is
unknown. If appellate courts were to institute
review of sentencing, the supposed trade-off of
penal policy and the review of conviction could
take place in the appellate courts. If the trade-<>ff
became possible, courts would be producing a new
product for the criminal process. Whatever time
the performance of this role required of the appellate court would be in production of a different
output. The older product or output of the appellate court had required the reviewing of the guilt
determination and the work of investigative agents.
But it is impossible to predict that the total time
spent on criminal appeals will increase or decrease
because of the institution of review of sentence.181
Time expended by an appellate court on criminal appeals of all kinds is time taken from other
matters. But distinguishing criminal appeals is
Carrington, Crowded Dockets at 576.
Palmer, A Model of Crimittal Dispositions: An
Alternative to Official Discretion at Sentencing, 62 GEo.
L.J. 1 (1973).
181 But see Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 720--21.
179

180
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useful because it allows for identification of the
options not available for reforming the courts to
make them produce more. Without complete
theoretical justification, the fundamental value
judgment has been made that our criminal process
needs lawyers and review of guilt determinations.182
Put another way, lawyers at trial and at least one
review of a guilt determination with lawyers are
necessary inputs.
In judging the time element involved in these
decisions of :fixed inputs, "indigent appeals" are
not the problem. While "indigents" surely have
every incentive to appeal since appeal comes at
zero cost to them, all defendants have more incentives to appeal when the system operates
basically on a trial plus at least one review. Of
course some clients will be deterred by lack of
resources from pursuing some appeals, but in hiring a lawyer's services for a criminal case clients
increasingly purchase a trial plus review and the
opportunity for a re-trial.182 The ability to purchase
the services of an attorney may be an important
variable in assessing the time spent on review. If
a lawyer is paid for his services he may have an
incentive to deliver more than the minimum of a
trial and one appeal. The paid lawyer may seek
more appeals in order to make the paying client
see himself as better off than the non-paying or
indigent defendant. Or the paid lawyer may have
an incentive to make maximum use of the appellate process dependent upon his client's resources.
Such incentives may translate into more time
spent upon appeals by paying clients. However,
the costs of invoking the process of review may
not be an important variable in assessing the time
spent on review. The hypothesis might be tested
by comparing those states which place a near zero
monetary cost on invoking the process of review
by providing every convicted person with a transcript and charge no fees to those states that impose direct costs in order to invoke the appellate
process.184
Similarly, the option of increasing sentences for
"frivolous appeals" 185 is probably not available.
Such a method of internalizing some of the costs
182 Hazard, Rationing J1estice. It is fixed unless the
Supreme Court will reexamine Gideon.
183The defendant is at least trying to gain the bargaining position of a retrial if not outright acquittal.
184 In California, Massachusetts, and Ohio free transcripts are available to all criminal defendants. CAL.
Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 69952 (West, Supp. 1973); MAss.
.ANN. LAWS ch. 278 § 33A (1972) (felonies); Omo Rev.
CODE Tit. 23, §§ 2301.23, 2301.24, 2301.25 (1955).
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of appeal to the convicted will lead to the due
process objection that a sentence has been increased solely because of appeaJ.IS 6 While a successful appellant litigant could not be punished,
the unsuccessful litigant would. Thus some potentially successful litigants would be deterred from
appealing by such a system. A second objection
would be that punishment would be inflicted by
appellate courts without a legal determination of
the "crime." In this connection, it is significant
that appellate courts have not used their rule
authority to add "damages" to a litigant who pursues a frivolous appeal in criminal cases.!87 By
their language, the rules might be thought to apply
to only civil litigation. Courts would find, were
they to consider the applicability of these rules to
"criminal" cases, that the punishment of even a
fine would have been inflicted without a legal determination of guilt.
The time expended in review of criminal convictions becomes a function of defining the product of the appellate courts, choosing between the
available options of inputs, and then measuring
the output. The most frequent measure of success
of criminal appeals, reversal rates,lss seems to
ignore the primary function of appellate courts.
The convicted litigant or his lawyer will measure
the output in this manner. The fact ofreversal is irrelevant to an appellate court, as a lawmaker in
many aspects of crim.inallaw. Surely to the judges
who voted for affirmance, the appeal ended successfully. Furthermore, a case that clarifies the
legal issues in a problem area of the law is a success for the court.189 A self-evaluating appellate
185Hazard, After tlze Trial Court-Tlte Realities of
Appellate Review in THE CoURTS, THE PuBLic AND THE
LAW ExPLOSION 60, 84 (1965).
186 Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973); Stynchecombe v. Chaffin, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 u.s. 711 (1969).
187 See, e.g., Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
R.38. Cf. United States ex rel. Boyd v. Rundle, 437
F.2d 405, 406 (3d Cir. 1970).
188 Carrington, Crowded Dockets at 578; Haworth,
Screening and Summary Proced1tres in tlte United States
Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257, 309-19
(1973); Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 706.
189 United States ex ret. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d
739 (3d Cir. 1972) (en bane). A 7-2 majority's overruling of its prior panel decision in United States v.
Zeiler, 427 F.2d 130S (3d Cir. 1970), is hardly an
example of an appellate failure because there was no
reversal. Of some importance in judging appellate
success may be the fact that two judges in tlie 3-2-3
majoritv switched from their own previous position in
Zeiler Gudges Van Dusen and Adams), 461 F.2d at
740, 746. But an equally erroneous criterion would be
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-court must develop measurements related to its
institutional function.
The institutional role for federal courts demonstrates that research aimed at exploring limitations on collateral review is certainly appropriate.
The option of limiting access to this form of review
is thus available.190 But any innovation in limiting
federal review by collateral attack must await
some careful analysis. The appellate courts should
also exercise restraint in relying more upon the
necessary inputs-the lawyers at trial and on
appeals-to raise issues for appellate decisionmaking. An example of this need for judicial restraint is the still debated issue of the insanity
defense. Do lawyers fail to raise the issue as often
as some appellate judges might like because their
clients do not perceive the benefit of such defensesi9J or because they ignore an important issue
of law? The issue of insanity may be symbolically
extremely important to appellate courts and legal
scholars because it deals with moral issues in the
criminal law. But the fact that few lawyer-litigants
choose to defend on the basis of insanity and few
appellate advocates raise the issue presents an
important question for the appellate court: is this
an issue of law that remains unresolved because of
legislative unwillingness or inability to answer the
question of why there is an insanity defense? 192 If
the answer is in the affirmative, the appellate court
is starting to articulate its responsibility for the
"justice" output by leaving such an issue for legislative action or inaction. But the courts might
have an input into the legislative decision to act
or not to act by .raising questions about the administration of the legislative determination that
a "mad and bad" syndrome can exist within the
law.J9J
The issue of "delay" of appellate dispositions in
criminal appeals will be raised in this period of
demands for an efficient judiciary. The appellate
courts must see that all such alleged issues are
really functions of larger and more important
issues. The question of whether "delay" in appelthat the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the majority
on the point. See Ash v. United States, 413 U.S. 300
(1973).
1go Friendly, Collateral Review.
191 Bazelon, Efficient Courts at 672-73.
192 Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish tlze Insanity Defense-Why Not'/, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Goldstein,
Tlze Braw11er Rule-Why'/ or 110 More Nonsense on Nonsense in the Criminal Law, Please!, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q.

126 (1973).
m Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972).
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late dispositions of a criminal appeal is a reason
for granting bail194 raises the question of the purposes of bail in general. Should the same criteria
be used for bail prior to trial versus bail after trial
pending appeal? A great degree of confidence in
the effectiveness or "fairness" of criminal trials
might lead one to argue that no one should be
entitled to bail pending appeal. After all, a system
of money bail starts to raise the issue of "indigency"195 and those out on bail have no incentive
to stop appealing. If lawyers are to be disciplined
for "delay" in criminal appeals,196 is that because
the lawyers have violated the standard of advocacy
in the jurisdiction in failing to pursue the appeal
expeditiously? If there is delay in state collateral
attack.,197 is federal habeas corpus appropriate
because state opportunities to litigate are inadequate? If the legislature declares that a certain
appellate decision must be done within a specified
time,U8 is an appellate court free to affirm or re~
verse automatically if the time period is violated?
If the government is allowed to appeal certain
decisions, what criteria will be used to determine
that the appeal is for "delay" and what sanctions
follow such a determination? 199
Time is one of the commodities of input into the
appellate court's output in criminal law of determining whether the individual is rightfully convicted. The appellate courts must insist that the
fixed input of counsel at trial spend its time defending against the charge and that other fixed
input of counsel on appeal spend its time seeking
at least one review based on the defense made out
at trial. Such an approach starts to reward those
appellate lawyers who successfully follow the de1M See, e.g., Rivera v. Concepcion, 469 F.2d 17 (1st
Cir. 1972). Contra, State ex rei. Mastriani v. Tahash,
277 Minn. 309, 152 N.W.2d 786 (1967) (three year
delay on habeas corpus petition-petitioner serving life
sentence for first degree murder).
195 PACKER, LIMITS at 216-217.
196 United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir.
1970).
197 Duke v. State, _ Ind. _, 298 N.E.2d 453 (1973)
(held that 2~2 year delay deprived the defendant of a
prompt appeal); Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.
1971) (held that petitioner is entitled to a speedy probation revocation hearing). But see Mastriani v. Tahash,
277 Minn. 309, 152 N.W.2d 786 (1967).
198 See, e.g., 28 U.S. C. § 1826(a) & (b) (1970) (federal
recalcitrant witness statute provides that an appeal
from an order of confinement must be disposed of
within thirty days).
199 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (amended 1971) provides in
part: "An appeal by the United States shall lie ... from
a decision or order ... suppressing ... evidence ... if
the United States attorney certifies to the district court
that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay...."
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fense strategy as opposed to those who raise issues
not used in defense of the criminal charge. Awarding this type of appellate strategy is necessary
to prevent the institutional defense services from
rationing justice. Without such appellate court
control there exists the possibility that the defender
organizations are trading invisibly time spent on
individual appeals for time on "significant" or
"winning issues." But more important is the need
to examine the impact of the institutional defense counsel in the criminal process to determine
whether criminal appeals are part of the invisible
form of the "bargain model" of the criminal process.200
It may well be that the specialization in the
various stages of a criminal proceeding which is
made possible by the vast volume of cases which
comes to the Voluntary Defender's office promotes
efficiency and provides expert service .... These
twin qualities of ~e divisions of labor and spt;cialization are the pillars of the large modem pnvate
law firm. On the other hand, in such an institutionalized system there are inherent the risks of a
loss of the close confidential relationship between
litigant and counsel and the subordination of an
individual client's interest to the larger interest of
the organization. These risks of course are greater
in the case of indigents for whose clientele there is
no compensating pressure of competition. United
States v. Moore, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (1970).
See also United States ex rel. McCoy v. Rundle,
419 F.2d 118, 119-20 (1969) (Freeman, J., concurring).
Cj. Co=ent, Client Ser<!ice in a Defender Organization:
The Philadelplria Experience, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 448,
468-69 (1969).
200
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Conclttsion
Legal scholars cannot ignore the demand for
more efficient courts by claiming that law or justice is not rationed. They must join the debate
on judicial administration by explaining the policies of the law that create the apparent conflict
with the goal of more efficient courts. This examination of the implications of the right of counsel
and access to review cases is a portion of the overall debate. A second obligation of legal scholarship
is to develop through legal analysis testable hypotheses that researchers in other disqplines can
use in their decisions about courts and related
institutions. In this regard, it should be noted that
certain kinds of data about the operation of courts
will be gathered because of the legislatively defined
research functions of federal court executives.
Thus, the second goal of this article has been to
offer some suggestions for research that should
enable courts, court administrators, evaluators of
courts, and the providers of counsel in criminal law
to allocate the resources that society is devoting to
criminal law administration. And finally this
article has demonstrated that the alleged problem
of "delay" in at least criminal appeals is a matter
of determining what are the fixed and variable
inputs of the appellate courts' product or function
in criminal law. "Delay" in criminal appeals is a
matter of identifying the variable input of time in
criminal law litigation.

